reacts; he certainly has no need to adopt the tactics, necessary in the case of the reacting man, of making false and biased valuations of his object. It is, in point of fact, for this reason that the aggressive man has at all times enjoyed the stronger, bolder, more aristocratic, and also freer outlook, the better conscience.” 
This is not inauthentic action on the behalf or at the behest of another or greater cause since in this case, there is not a cause more suitable or apt than the will to act and the total responsibility for this willed action. This will and action, intertwined at the route and thus parallel, is ultimately aware, purposeful, acute and a forthright extension of the individual self. Hence the individual subsists by operating freely, unperturbed by guilt but guided with conscience and behaving responsibly yet without morality.
As a derivative from the previous sentences words responsibility without morality, it is plausible to advance a solution to the apparent issue of how it is that one may become if one is additionally destined to themselves and do this effortlessly. Deliberating such a dilemma one cannot resist thinking about the probability that within the exclusive academic quest for a Nietzschean truth  , a rational and substantiated comprehension of the route from slave to sovereign, the eccentricities of authorship have emerged as the over analysis of a subtle point. Auguste Comte may very well tell us that “the eye cannot see itself”  , yet the academic struggles to reductively departmentalise it in order to elaborate its complexities. In becoming what you are, the eye needs to feel rather than see itself. In other words, there does not need to be friction between the ideas of being destined to who you are and becoming what you are if there is a willingness to take full responsibility for their acts as if the two were literally inseparable. As previously stated, the weak i.e. the member of the herd has a relation to themselves strictly by means of contrast with the dominant or via a mediator e.g. God, the clergymen or the truths of science. In comparison the noble or the strong does not have the necessity to discover his strength or have it affirmed they quite simply express it as an embodiment. Hence the sovereign individual does retain their conscience yet he feels no guilt since there is no authority over and above him to ensure his stigma. He simply is by his actions. With a fair degree of confidence we can now say that alleged poison is pregnant with its own antidote, considering the two confusions recognised at the beginning of this chapter are in fact now means by which the answer is born. To overcome oneself is to recognise that the world revolves around you that the self is the epicentre of an existence and the root cause for all happenings involving that individual minus stigma and its various associations. Hence I am destined or doomed rather to what I am because I am responsible as a fact of free existence.
3) On Frederick Nietzsche, part 2:
The intention herein is to provide clarification on some points concerning Nietzsche’s idea of perspectivism. Primarily, to illuminate what I believe is its unquestionable centrality to Nietzsche’s thinking and to do this by honing in on some different features of Nietzsche’s writing by means of a paragon of the coherence or to put it another way inseparability of even the most audacious of assertions from perspectivism. Secondarily, to reconcile perspectivism with what I consider is its genesis i.e. transcendental idealism. This secondary intention perhaps appears to be something of a contradiction in terms, however it has to be said that seeming contradictions are so prevalent in Schopenhauer’s and particularly Nietzsche’s manuscripts that coming across another in trying to elaborate can really only be viewed as wholly logical.  An instance of such an occasion is a subject that I divulged at some length in chapter two i.e. the misleadingly blatant problem of Nietzsche’s insistence that one has to become and moreover overcome yourself, in addition to maintaining a determinism that defines the unavoidable or inescapable personality of all individuals.
Yet this, similar to a myriad of equally apparent contradictions, can be easily settled if the strict demands of logical laws: those of non-contradiction, were to be derestricted and the affirmation of psychology and the experiential permitted higher regard or more of an acceptance than is generally permitted. Thus, the demand to become need not necessarily conflict with the descriptions of personality if we concede that the acts one performs are not detachable from the will which is a harbinger of them, it is no further concession to state that action and the will are at base interweaved. Accordingly one overcomes themselves, accomplishes total responsibility and individuality without having to radically alter their personality. What is really demanded is an absolute acceptance of one’s character as personal or inalienable from the individual’s self-definition. This is the means by which we can realise responsibility in the absence of morality and individuality minus reference to the other. And it is by an agnate means of thought from the subjective, rather than towards the objective, that the apparent paradox of perspectivism derived from transcendental idealism may receive explanatory resolution.
However, the imposition of formality still requires that we maintain some type of order, at the least to avoid communicative and receptive disorder, thus the prime concern is the explanation of the paramount importance of perpectivism to Nietzsche’s thought.
Herein it is not my intention to provide my personal interpretation of perspectivism as the commitment herein is to keep as closely possible to the words and meaning of Nietzsche, in order to avert the threat of conflation or confoundedness in addition to ensuring that the journey from transcendental idealism to perspectivism that it is my intention to map, is clear from obtrusive and unnecessary obstruction. Taking this into consideration we shall use as exemplary examples of perspectivism the attendant two quotes: “there are no facts only interpretations”  and; “truths are only illusions which we have forgotten are illusions.”  Armed with these quotations as functioning definitions of the term perspectivism we can start to divulge the paramount centrality and importance to Nietzsche’s thought and propose, what I consider to be self-evident, i.e. the said term is not purely a necessary instrument to enable Nietzsche’s contradictory rife philosophical system to work expediently and harmoniously, as portrayed at the start of this chapter. Rather that perspectivism is the bedrock or seed from which Nietzsche’s thought is planted in and grows. Perspectivism is the element that binds together Nietzsche’s collective claims and is the scope through which he sees things. Ultimately, in plain format, if we commit to the idea that there is no truth, as a consequence of which everything is vulnerable to query and subjective interpretation, thus nothing expressed is invalid. Actually, every expression holds validity purely due to the fact that it has been expressed. Or as we saw in chapter two Nietzsche puts it; “The action is everything.” That is the venting or in this particular case free expression, of will.
At this stage one may be forgiven for assuming sufficient confidence as a derivative of this initial elaboration to taking a ‘flight of fancy’ in the direction of an advancement of the inestimable and fundamental significance of perspectivism to reading Nietzsche and quite frankly there may be justification for this assumptive confidence. Yet for the benefit of certainty and precision I shall forward some further examples as reinforcements to the same effect. One such aspect and example of thinking heavily interlinked with the maxims of perspectivism is deconstruction of the unconditional truth. Which is a truth of the type previously mentioned: an expression of thought made and crafted by means of a march toward the objective, the most appropriate example of which may be observed in scientific/causal thought. Consider the following extract from Nietzsche’s On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense:
“And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life. Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly-as though the world’s axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity, that he feels the flying centre of the universe within himself. [. . .] And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.” 
Following such statements one is confronted with a sense of the bizarrely ridiculous nature of what is viewed as intellectual thought when it is self-dedicated or inwardly votive. A response such as this finds its decidedness in the acknowledgement of what has to be deemed the blind naivety of a form of thought which can solely learn in hindsight and then imposes its dominance over being by arrogantly claiming knowledge. Needless to say these are issues that are not alien to the philosopher who is aware of the limitation of their intellectual prowess evidenced by the age-old debates colloquiums books and papers surrounding epistemic matters that merely begin with the cogito  and constantly swell in their intricacy from there on. Perhaps we may wish to remind ourselves of the problems raised by David Hume as regards the elusive explanation of the necessary connexion within a causal chain from one event to the next or the Humean circle and the problem of inductive inference, that is the evolution of knowledge which appears to demand prediction without reference to previous events and the principle of the homogeneity of nature. It is vivid that what Nietzsche plans to play on are those precise epistemic issues and the absence of an effect they appear to have on people unconcerned with philosophy yet closely involved in the quest for the objective, unconditional truth. After all (as chapter two’s quotation stipulated) it was Comte who wrote “the eye cannot see itself.” And if one is predisposed to propose the subjectivity of the conscious mind as indeed does Nietzsche, then the possibility is plausible that what I see is no more determinate than the eyes themselves with which I see it. In the words of Schopenhauer, “The world is my representation.” If the unconditional truth fails to stand to reason then the beliefs based upon this truth and institutions built on the laws that these truths connote are baseless. As Nietzsche claims: “Convictions [beliefs] are prisons for the mind.” 
If an one chooses to give Nietzsche the benefit of the doubt and take him at his above word on this matter then that they may be inspired to divest themselves of all prior held convictions, i.e. beliefs, truths and habits out of the worry that their individuality is otherwise at risk of staling. Those of us who do take this choice and task themselves to such a kartharsis will at some point discover themselves perspectivists. Hence one may claim that as the doubt and scepticism directed towards the unconditional truth increases, perspectivism provides the cure. Before we carry on our enquiry I would like to take the opportunity now to address what, for some, is a tough counter question to the assertion of perspectivism as a remedy to being chained by ones beliefs or assertions of truth. That question focuses on worry that what Nietzsche accomplishes in deconstructing objectivity is in fact not a complete triumph but rather a coup d’état. In effect not the true synthesis of two polarised positions but the disposing of one purely and simply replaced by another despotism of a different form yet similar content. This question succinctly phrased may have such an appearance; does Nietzsche reject the unconditional truth unconditionally and consequently fall into the pitfall of circularity and negation? Whilst including this criticism as one that warrants a response I do not feel that it one that requires too much focus. It is actually solely the wish to be thorough that invokes its acknowledgement, not the potency of critique in itself. In defence one may respond with the statement that perspectivism, by definition, is not and cannot be purely an unconditional truth redesigned to seem otherwise. An accusation of this type is only justifiable when the premise is not thoroughly enough investigated. Again by definition perspectivism requires that the subject make of it what they will and moreover, to make of truth what they will. Put differently, if facts are non-existent and interpretations on the other hand are existent then truths are the sole responsibility of the perceiver i.e. the subject in question. Hence what is coaxed is not an unconditional truth reconstituted rather the unashamed reconstruction of the way in which one views the world in front of them to such an extent that the centre of the universe is located soundly internally and therefore perceived from the self. In contrast objectivist’s demand episteme of the world from without, a method that amputates the variations innate to the subjectivity to portray a definite and linear display. Michel Foucault  identifies this latter mode of thinking within his elaboration of history and epistemology. 
“The project of a total history is one that seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilisation, the principle material or spiritual – of a society, the significance common to all phenomena of a period, the law that accounts for their cohesion – what is called metaphorically the ‘face’ of a period. Such a project is linked to two or three hypothesis; – it is supposed that between all the events of a well-defined spatio-temporal area, between all the phenomena of which traces have been found, it must be possible to establish a system of homogeneous relations: a network of causality that makes it possible to derive each of them, relations of analogy that show how they symbolise one another, or how they all express one and the same central core; it is also supposed that one and the same form of historicity operates upon economic structures, social institutions and customs, the inertia of mental attitudes, technological practice, political behaviour, and subjects them all to the same type of transformation; lastly, it is supposed that history itself may be articulated into greater units – stages or phases – which contain within themselves their own principle of cohesion.” 
This historical outlook, a total history, is one example of the analytical methodology of the objectivist an example that nietzcshe and his perspectivism tries to counter. Instead of striving to define what one becomes aware of through perception by a single, unconditional method thereby enveloping everything in a specific apperceiving concept (ironically comprehended solely by the perceiver), perspectivism attempts to embrace and inspire the importance of the subject to their outlook of the world. Hence it can be seen as an attempt at the reunification of the eye with the image, the cause and effect and according to Nietzsche, the lightening with the thunder. It seems that it is strictly in keeping with this aspiration for reunification or reconciliation that I proceed to clarify the cementation of perspectivism and transcendental idealism. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, despite the appearance of polarity between the two theories, actually it is ultimately a matter of non-contradiction to relate them.
Before commencing this latter phase of reconciliation it is obligatory of any such bid to intrinsically break down the premises of transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealism can be described as that something between the Kantian noumina and nomina; and has been defined as the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing itself, this latter definition is in sync with the most notable of exponents of transcendental idealism: Schopenhauer. Continuing by way of defining this intrinsic clarification; that there is a true, a real or as Schopenhauer termed it the will,  i.e. the unity that is objectified in the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. In a simplistic sense, the stance implies that although there is a truth and unity this truth and unity is outside the limits of human consciousness because of the subjective nature of said consciousness. Hence to be a transcendental idealist one could discover themselves ready to concede the notion in the aforementioned quotation that “there are no facts, only interpretations” on the condition that the there is a reconfiguration an altering addition is requisite one which affirms that statement as strictly applicable to the individual. Put in contemporary words that such a notion may be a justified belief but it is not true by any means. For infantile eagerness, the above definition of transcendental idealism makes for conditions that make it all too easy to construct a bridge with perspectivism. This is accomplished by concentrating (too much) on the contrast between the idea of subjectivity in perception and Immanuel Kant’s demand it is not possible for the conscious mind to ever know the thing itself or at least to escape from the subjectivity of consciousness which is the imaginary and unassailable mountain in front of truth.  This may be viewed as a bid to illuminate the suggestion that if we cannot escape our subjectivity then we are without choice but to accept it hence Nietzsche’s perspectivism changes into merely being expressive of frustrated acceptance formed from the absence of an alternative. That Nietzsche’s fundamental assertion is saturated in the thought that if there is nothing one can do to change their circumstances then the sole remaining option (if one can call it that) is acceptance. In this fashion the cursory reader of Nietzsche would try to minimise the distance between the pair if not paint even more infantile parallels. In the majority of instances the quickest route is often the least memorable. Because when all is said and done a by-product of the acquisition of speed can be all too pessimistically the forfeiture of diligence.
It is self-evident that Nietzsche retains little room and less time for truth however this is not because of an unwilling acknowledgement of its irrelevance in relation to the individual. More than anything, perspectivism can be seen as the defining stance of the absolute lack of truth. Essentially, what is yearned for is not the minimising of the proximity from transcendental idealism to perspectivism to such an extent that the two are inseparable but the explicit elaboration of the route from transcendental idealism to perspectivism. The ontology of this is that in a sense one laboriously bears the other, not that the two are the same.  My assertion is that this is accomplished in the following fashion. if we acknowledge, as the indeed we have been at pains to point out that the transcendental idealist in fact does, that the subjectivity of the mind is the chief obstruction to episteme of truth then what epistemic instrument may we depend on to claim the existence of an unconditional truth in any event? After all transcendental idealist’s take the stance of objectivity as a result of their demand for certainty as evidence for the announcement of knowledge but what can be certain about a truth that the very nature of our condition does not allow knowledge of? It seems as though the transcendental idealist is hunting a gieste that they the transcendental idealists themselves must constantly reconfirm the existence of. Hence Nietzsche’s perspectivism tries to annihilate these contradictions and finds respite in the affirmation of the only thing that can be known, i.e. the knower. Once again “[. . .] we are unknown to ourselves we knowers.” It is established on that foundation of introspective knowledge or knowledge from the subjective, that we can then start to fathom a comprehension of being or